This document provide note and summary of RFC 5585, DKIM Service Overview.
DKIM defines a domain-level digital signature authentication framework for email through the use of private-/public-key (asymmetric) cryptography and using the Domain Name System (DNS) as its key server technology.
DKIM uses a domain name as an identifier. Identifier refer to the identity of a responsible person or organization. The same identity can have multiple identifiers. This identifier is called the Signing Domain IDentifier (SDID) and is contained in the DKIM-Signature header fields "d=" tag. The owner of the SDID is declaring that they accept responsibility for the message and can thus be held accountable for it.
A DKIM signature:
Does not authenticate or verify the contents of the message header or body, such as the author "From" field, beyond certifying data integrity between the time of signing and the time of verifying.
Does not offer any assertions about the behaviors of the signer.
Does not prescribe any specific actions for receivers to take upon successful signature verification.
Does not provide protection after signature verification.
Does not protect against re-sending (replay of) a message that already has a verified signature; therefore, a transit intermediary or a recipient can re-post the message — that is, post it as a new message — with the original signature remaining verifiable, even though the new recipient(s) might be different from those who were originally specified by the author.
2. The DKIM Value Proposition
2.1. Identity Verification
An assessment service that uses DKIM can differentiate between a domain (SDID) used by a known organization and a domain used by others. As such, DKIM performs the positive step of identifying messages associated with verifiable identities, rather than the negative step of identifying messages with problematic use of identities. Whether a verified identity belongs to a Good Actor or a Bad Actor is a question for later stages of assessment.
2.2. Enabling Trust Assessments
A valid DKIM signature neither lowers nor raises the level of trust associated with the message, but it enables other mechanisms to be used for doing so.
An organization might build upon its use of DKIM by publishing information about its Signing Practices (SP). This could permit detecting some messages that purport to be associated with a domain, but which are not. As such, an SP can cause the trust assessment to be reduced, or leave it unchanged.
2.3. Establishing Message Validity
An interesting side effect of the cryptographic method used by DKIM is that it is possible to be certain that a signed message (or, if "l=" is used, the signed portion of a message) has not been modified between the time of signing and the time of verifying. If it has been changed in any way, then the message will not be verified successfully with DKIM.
3. DKIM Goals
3.1. Functional Goals
Use Domain-Level Granularity for Assurance. DKIM binds a signing key record to a Domain Name as the SDID. Further benefits of using domain names include simplifying key management, enabling signing by the infrastructure as opposed to the MUA, and reducing privacy concerns.
Implementation Locality. Any party, anywhere along the transit path, can implement DKIM signing. Its use is not confined to particular systems, such as the author’s MUA or the inbound boundary MTA, and there can be more than one signature per message.
Allow Delegation of Signing to Independent Parties. DKIM was designed to support signing by any of these different parties and to permit them to sign with any domain name that they deem appropriate (and for which they hold authorized signing keys).
Distinguish the Core Authentication Mechanism from Its Derivative Uses. An authenticated identity can be subject to a variety of assessment policies, either ad-hoc or standardized. DKIM separates basic authentication from assessment. The only semantics inherent to a DKIM signature are that the signer is asserting some kind of responsibility for the message.
Retain Ability to Have Anonymous Email. DKIM is compatible with this goal since it permits authentication of the email system operator, rather than the content author. If it is possible to obtain effectively anonymous accounts at example.com, knowing that a message definitely came from example.com does not threaten the anonymity of the user who authored it.
3.2. Operational Goals
Make Presence of Signature Transparent to Non-Supporting Recipients. Recipient that does not support DKIM still can read the message.
Treat Verification Failure the Same as No Signature Present. If verification of the message’s signature failed, the message will revert to normal handling, through the receiver’s existing filtering mechanisms.
Permit Incremental Adoption for Incremental Benefit. DKIM allows pairwise sets of email providers and spam filtering companies to distinguish mail that is associated with a known organization, versus mail that might deceptively purport to have the affiliation. This in turn allows the development of "whitelist" schemes whereby authenticated mail from a known source with good reputation is allowed to bypass some anti-abuse filters.
Minimize the Amount of Required Infrastructure. DKIM makes no changes to the core Internet Mail service and its reliance on the Domain Name System (DNS) greatly reduces the amount of new administrative infrastructure that is needed across the open Internet.
Permit a Wide Range of Deployment Choices. DKIM can be deployed at a variety of places within an organization’s email service. This affords flexibility in terms of who administers its use, as well as what traffic carries a DKIM signature.
4. DKIM Function
4.1. Basic Signing
With the DKIM signature mechanism, a signer chooses an SDID, performs digital signing on the message, and adds the signature information using a DKIM header field. A verifier obtains the domain name and the "selector" from the DKIM header field, obtains the public key associated with the name, and verifies the signature.
4.2. Characteristics of a DKIM Signature
A DKIM signature applies to the message body and selected header fields. The signer computes a hash of the selected header fields and another hash of the body. The signer then uses a private key to cryptographically encode this information, along with other signing parameters. Signature information is placed into "DKIM-Signature:", a new [RFC5322] message header field.
4.3. The Selector Construct
A single SDID can have multiple signing keys and/or multiple potential signers. To support this, DKIM identifies a particular signature as using a combination of the SDID and an added field, called the "selector", specified in a separate "DKIM-Signature:" header field parameter.
Message recipients can verify the signature by querying the DNS for the signer’s domain directly, to retrieve the appropriate public key, and thereby confirm that the message was signed by a party in possession of the private key for the SDID.
Typically, verification will be done by an agent in the Administrative Management Domain (ADMD) of the message recipient.
4.5. Sub-Domain Assessment
To permit assessments that are independent, one method is for an organization to use different sub-domains as the SDID tag.
5. Service Architecture
DKIM uses external service components, such as for key retrieval and relaying email. This specification defines an initial set, using DNS and SMTP, for basic interoperability.
| |- RFC5322 Message V +--------+ +--------------------------------+ | Private| | ORIGINATING OR RELAYING ADMD | | Key +...>| Sign Message with SDID | | Store | +---------------+----------------+ +--------+ | (paired) [Internet] +--------+ | +-----------+ | Public | +--------------------------------+ | Remote | | Key | | RELAYING OR DELIVERING ADMD | | Sender | | Store | | Message Signed? | | Practices | +----+---+ +-----+--------------------+-----+ +-----+-----+ . |yes |no . . V | . . +-------------+ | . +.......>| Verify +--------+ | . | Signature | | | . +------+------+ | | . pass| fail| | . V | | . +-------------+ | | . | | | | . +.......>| Assessments | | | . . | | V V . . +-----+--+----+ +-------+ . . | | / Check \<............+ . | +-------->/ Signing \ . | / Practices \<..........+ . | +-------+-------+ . . | | . . | V . +----+--------+ | +-----------+ +------+-----+ |Reputation/ | | | Message | | Local Info | |Accreditation| +----------->| Filtering | | on Sender | |Info | | Engine | | Practices | +-------------+ +-----------+ +------------+ Figure 1: DKIM Service Architecture
Signing can be performed by a component of the ADMD that creates the message, and/or within any ADMD along the relay path. The signer uses the appropriate private key that is associated with the SDID.
Verifying is performed by an authorized module within the verifying ADMD. Within a delivering ADMD, verifying might be performed by an MTA, MDA, or MUA. The module verifies the signature or determines whether a particular signature was required. Verifying the signature uses public information from the Key Store. If the signature passes, reputation information is used to assess the signer and that information is passed to the message filtering system. If the signature fails or there is no signature using the author’s domain, information about signing practices related to the author can be retrieved remotely and/or locally, and that information is passed to the message filtering system.
Messages lacking a valid author signature can prompt a query for any published "signing practices" information, as an aid in determining whether the author information has been used without authorization.
A popular use of reputation information is as input to a Filtering Engine that decides whether to deliver — and possibly whether to specially mark — a message.
Their details are outside of the scope of DKIM, other than the expectation that the verified identity produced by DKIM can accumulate its own reputation, and will be added to the varied soup of rules used by the engines.
DKIM uses public-/private-key (asymmetric) cryptography. The signer uses a private key and the verifier uses the corresponding public key. The current DKIM Signing specification provides for querying the Domain Names Service (DNS), to permit a verifier to obtain the public key. The signing organization therefore needs to have a means of adding a key to the DNS, for every selector/SDID combination. Further, the signing organization needs policies for distributing and revising keys.
If a message contains a valid signature, then the verifier can evaluate the associated domain name’s reputation, in order to determine appropriate delivery or display options for that message.
Signing Practices (SP)
Separate from determining the validity of a signature, and separate from assessing the reputation of the organization that is associated with the signed identity, there is an opportunity to determine any organizational practices concerning a domain name.
The statements of practice are made at the level of a domain name, and are distinct from assessments made about particular messages, as occur in a Message Filtering Engine.
As practices are defined, each domain name owner needs to consider what information to publish. The nature and degree of checking practices, if any are performed, is optional to the evaluating site and is strictly a matter of local policy.